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Abstract—Powered by new advances in sensor development
and artificial intelligence, the decreasing cost of computation,
and the pervasiveness of handheld computation devices, biometric
user authentication (and identification) is rapidly becoming ubiq-
uitous. Modern approaches to biometric authentication, based on
sophisticated machine learning techniques, cannot avoid storing
either trained-classifier details or explicit user biometric data,
thus exposing users’ credentials to falsification. In this paper,
we introduce a secure way to handle user-specific information
involved with the use of vector-space classifiers or artificial
neural networks for biometric authentication. Our proposed
architecture, called a Neural Fuzzy Extractor (NFE), allows the
coupling of pre-existing classifiers with fuzzy extractors, through
a artificial-neural-network-based buffer called an expander, with
minimal or no performance degradation. The NFE thus offers
all the performance advantages of modern deep-learning-based
classifiers, and all the security of standard fuzzy extractors. We
demonstrate the NFE retrofit to a classic artificial neural network
for a simple scenario of fingerprint-based user authentication.
Index Terms—Security, Deep Learning, Fuzzy Extractor, Au-
thentication, Artificial Neural Network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure architectures for password-based authentication
avoid storing the passwords corresponding to each username,
and resort instead to storing cryptographic hash digests of
such passwords (along with salt, pepper, and other such non-
secret randomness). The rationale behind this widely-accepted
paradigm is that not even a superuser, with complete access
to the entire file system, should be able to fraudulently log in
as one of the other, less privileged users of the system.
When using standard biometric authentication in place of
(or in addition to) a password, similar functionality can be
achieved through the use of fuzzy extractors [1]. However,
despite their security guarantees, fuzzy extractor architectures
are rarely deployed in practice. For example, in the case of
fingerprint-based authentication it turns out that similarity-
score algorithms based on artificial neural networks usually
perform slightly better than fuzzy extractors, and this has led
to a preference for the former. However, using similarity-score
algorithms involves the storing of fingerprint databases, which
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under
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are vulnerable to leakage. Notable examples are the Office of
Personnel Management data breach of 2015 [2], in which 5.6
million sets of fingerprints were leaked, and the more recent
Suprema Biostar leak of 2019 [3], which compromised the
fingerprint and facial biometric information of more than one
million people. An authentication method which has both the
security of fuzzy extractors and the superior performance of
similarity-score algorithms would clearly be prefered.
The reason behind the inferior performance of fuzzy ex-
tractors may be traced back to the very essence of fuzzy
extractor functionality, the first stage of which consists of a
channel decoding mechanism over a vector space. By nature,
good channel coding implicitly assumes spherical (or close to
spherical) decoding regions, which correspond to the decision
regions of the vector-space-based classifier. In contrast to
this, normal support-vector machines (SVMs) can learn highly
irregular decision regions – hence their superiority. Similarly,
artificial neural networks (ANNs) are known to outperform
even the best of SVMs (at least in situations in which training
data is abundant), and this is attributed to their ability to learn
highly-irregular classification functions.
Unfortunately, both SVMs and ANNs (as well as the other
frequently-used classifiers, like k-nearest neighbors (KNN),
decision trees and random forests, etc.) rely on learned struc-
tures that have to be stored in non-volatile memory, similarly
to a password file. A malicious user, with access to this
information, could use the learned structure (for example,
by back-tracking through an ANN, or by simply choosing a
vector in the proper decision region, for an SVM) to produce
synthetic inputs guaranteed to pass the authentication test.
The question that arises naturally is then how we can protect
a user’s biometric authentication information in a manner
similar to the way in which we treat passwords, but without
suffering from the spherical restrictions of the fuzzy extractors.
In this paper, we propose a new (and severely overdue) such
architecture, which we call neural fuzzy extractors (NFEs).
NFEs are a concatenation of a classifier – such as an
artificial neural network – with a fuzzy extractor, as illustrated
in Figure 1. Nevertheless, as most ANNs are designed to
output class labels or scores contained within some ball in
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some vector space, and we want our NFE construction to
be as close as possible to an add-on, to take advantage
of many already-existing and well performing classification
architectures, we have to retrofit NFEs to regular ANNs.
We do this by constructing an interface between the ANN
and the fuzzy extractor’s decoding mechanism, which we
call an expander. An expander will typically consist of an
additional ANN with a few layers, that can be added to the
end of any type of ANN, and the sole purpose of which is
to re-cast the output embedding of the original ANN to a
vector space in which representatives from each class cluster
together in sphere-like clusters. The expander may be trained
independently, based on labeled embedings from the original
ANN, or together with the original ANN.
Of course, some already-existing ANN architectures, may
be naturally suited to concatenation with fuzzy extractors,
in the sense that their output embeddings corresponding to
different classes are already in a vector space and already
cluster in spheres. In these cases, no additional expander is
necessary.
We should also note that the above-mentioned vector spaces
need not be defined over Rn – as they are for the particular
architecture discussed in this paper – but can also be defined
over any other field, like GF (2n). In fact, the latter choice
is most likely the easiest to deal with (and hence our rec-
ommendation), mainly due to the wide availability of binary
channel capacity-achieving error correction codes (ECCs) –
by contrast, additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel
capacity-achieving ECCs are few and suffering from very
complex decoding mechanisms.
The contributions of this paper are as follows.
1) We introduce NFEs, a first secure architecture for han-
dling ANN-based biometric user authentication.
2) We show how NFEs can be retro-fitted to work with any
already-existing ANN architecture of any type.
3) We provide a simple method through which the security
of NFEs – and implicitly the potential of a given
biometric for authentication – can be evaluated.
4) We demonstrate our construction on an already-existing
(but insecure) fingerprint-based authentication architec-
ture, making it secure through the use of an NFE.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II provides a brief survey of already-existing biometric
Fig. 1. Neural Fuzzy Extractor architecture.
authentication protocols, focusing mostly on recent results
involving artificial neural networks, and techniques that use
fuzzy extractors. Section III introduces the NFE architec-
ture and provides some implementation insights. Section IV
demonstrates how an already-existing fingerprint-based bio-
metric classifier can be adapted to work with the NFE, and
conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Biometric Authentication and Identification
The literature contains many early attempts at leveraging the
ANN capabilities for biometric verification and authentication.
[4] has filed a patent on biometric recognition using a clas-
sification neural network. The patented biometric recognition
system involves two phases: creation of a master pattern set of
authorized users’ biometric identifications and authentications
using a classification neural network. [5] developed a new
supervised recurrent neural network for fingerprint authenti-
cation. Their approaches used similarity measures of features
for clustering and ranking of the fingerprint representations
stored in their database. [6] used both artificial neural networks
and k-nearest neighbors as possible classifiers for typing
pattern identification. [7] investigates the implementation of
Weightless Neural Networks (WNNs) as a pattern recognition
tool to classify users’ typing patterns and thus attempts to
separate the real users from impostors. [8] used artificial neural
networks for face representation learning and recognition.
With the recent resurgence of interest in Deep Learning
models, in recent years we have witnessed significant pro-
gresses in representation learning for biometric identifiers by
deep neural networks. [9] has proposed FingerNet, a unified
deep network for fingerprint minutiae extraction. They propose
a new way to design a deep convolutional network combining
domain knowledge and the representation ability of deep
learning. In terms of orientation estimation, segmentation,
enhancement and minutiae extraction, several typical tradi-
tional methods that performed well on rolled/slap fingerprints
are transformed into a convolutional appraoch and integrated
as a unified plain network. [10] posed minutiae extraction
as a machine learning problem and proposed a deep neural
network – MENet, for Minutiae Extraction Network – to
learn a data-driven representation of minutiae points. [11] used
deep representations for Iris, Face, and Fingerprint Spoofing
Detection. Similarly, [12] learned fingerprint representations.
[13] proposed three variations of the VGGNet structure for
fingerprint classification.
Similarly, [14] proposed a secure multimodal biometric
system that uses a convolutional neural network (CNN) and a
Q-Gaussian multi support vector machine (QG-MSVM) based
on different level fusion. They developed two authentication
systems with two different level fusion algorithms: a feature
level fusion and a decision level fusion. The feature extraction
for individual modalities is performed using a CNN. In this
step, they selected two layers from the CNN that achieved the
highest accuracy, in which each layer is regarded as a separate
feature descriptor. After that, they combined them using the
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proposed internal fusion to generate the biometric templates.
In the next step, they applied one of the cancelable biometric
techniques to protect these templates and increase the security
of the proposed system.
Likewise, [15] conducted multimodal biometric face and
fingerprint recognition using neural networks based on adap-
tive principal component analysis and multilayer perceptrons.
[16] proposed a novel latent overlapped fingerprints separation
algorithm based on neural networks. [17] used convolutional
neural networks (CNNs) for fingerprint liveness detection.
[18] leveraged neural networks to both identify QRS
complex segments of ECG signals and then performed user
authentication on these segments. [19] used multilayer per-
ceptrons and radial basis function neural networks for electro-
cardiogram (ECG) biometric authentication. [20] proposed the
use of various recurrent neural network (RNN) architectures
(including vanilla, long short-term memory (LSTM), gated
recurrent unit (GRU), unidirectional, and bidirectional net-
works) for ECG-based biometrics identification/classification
and authentication. [21] presents Deep-ECG, a CNN-based
biometric approach for ECG signals identification, verification
and periodic re-authentication. Deep-ECG extracts promi-
nent features from one or more leads using a deep CNN
and compares biometric templates by computing simple and
fast distance functions for verification or identification. [22]
showed the novel use and effectiveness of deep learning CNN
architectures for automatic rather than hand-crafted feature
extraction for robust face recognition across time lapses. They
show CNNs using the VGG-Face deep networks produce
highly discriminative and interoperable features that are robust
to aging variations even across a mix of biometric datasets.
B. Fuzzy Extractors
Fuzzy extractors were introduced in [1] as a secure way
of coping with user biometrics – for which every new entry
is slightly different from previous ones, but all entries share
some common main features. The idea was that, instead of
storing representative entries, for direct comparison to the new
entries upon authentication request, the system should only
store digests obtained through cryptographic hash functions –
thus preventing biometric falsification.
The idea was quickly adapted to various types of biometric
authentication mechanisms, like those based on fingerprints
[23]–[27], iris scans [28]–[30], face [31] or gait [32], [33].
More recently, fuzzy extractors were used in the context
of more sophisticated and specialized secure authentication
mechanisms, like the one in [34], designed specifically for
wireless sensor networks (like body-area networks), or the
ones in [35], [36], which deal with the outputs of physically-
unclonable functions (PUFs).
However, to the best of our knowledge, at the time of this
writing, no works exist on the application of fuzzy extractors
on biometric data pre-processed by sophisticated classifiers
like support vector machines and artificial neural networks.
III. NEURAL FUZZY EXTRACTOR ARCHITECTURE
Most classifiers – whether neural networks or vector-space-
based – will output a vector representation of the input data.
In some cases, such as the one illustrated in Section IV, the
output vectors are already appropriate for direct input to the
secure sketch (see Figure 1). To satisfy this property, the
classifier outputs corresponding to each class of interest have
to cluster in a somewhat spherical region of the vector space.
This is because the secure sketch will use codes designed
for error correction on either white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channels, or on binary symmetric channels (BSCs), where
the decoding region is spherical by construction. So if the
classifier’s decision regions are not already spherical, imposing
spherical decoding regions on top of them will invariably
degrade the classification performance.
Unfortunately, in most cases, the classifiers are solely de-
signed for good accuracy, without extra constraints on the
spherical shape of their decision regions. In such cases, we
propose the use of an expander, as illustrated in Figure 1, to
further shape the classifier’s decision regions into spherical
ones. We call this procedure retrofitting the NFE to pre-
existing classifiers. Intuitively, we expect that in order to
avoid reducing the overall accuracy, we need to preserve as
much of the information content of the classifier output as
possible. This means that the expander will generally project
the vector representations of the classifier’s output to a larger-
dimensional space (hence the term “expander”), in which the
decision regions can be made spherical without significant
accuracy penalties. We should note here that in cases in which
the classifier is a neural network, the last layer often reduces
the dimension of the data – for instance, to fit the number of
relevant classes. In such cases, we propose to remove the last
(low-dimensional) layer of the neural network before attaching
the expander.
A. The Classifier
As mentioned above, with the option of retrofitting the
NFE to pre-existing classifiers, the only requirement for the
classifier is to process the users’ biometric readings into
vectors, in a vector space in which classification is possible
with reasonable accuracy. We do not expect that retrofitting
with the NFE will improve this accuracy in any way – nor
is that the purpose of the retrofit. The best we can hope
for is that the original classifier’s accuracy is maintained,
while the security of the system is greatly improved. As such,
our NFE scheme can work with multiple types of already-
existing classifiers, for example K-nearest-neighbors, support-
vector machines, or neural networks. The “neural” part of
“NFE” refers not to the retrofitted classifier, but rather to
the expander, which is invariably implemented as an artificial
neural network.
B. The Expander
The expander will be constructed as an additional neural
network, will take as input the output of the (trimmed or
intact) original classifier, and will be trained using a cost
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function that penalizes deviations form a spherical shape. If
the original classifier is a neural network, the training of the
expander can be done at the same time as that of the original
classifier – in essence, the procedure consists of simply adding
a constraint on the shape of the decision regions. However,
when retrofitting the NFE to an already-trained neural network,
separate training of the expander can be accomplished by
feeding it with labeled outputs of the (trimmed or intact)
original network, corresponding to some (original or novel)
training dataset.
C. The Secure Sketch
The secure sketch, as defined in [1], consists of (1) a
mechanism for mapping the fuzzy biometric of a user to a
fixed point in the vector space of the biometric representation,
coupled with (2) a secure method for storing such identifying
user information. If the fuzzy biometric data of our user is
situated in a roughly spherical region of the vector space,
then the first part can be accomplished by defining an error-
correction code over the vector space, and shifting it so that
the user’s decision sphere overlaps with one of the decoding
regions, corresponding to one of the codewords.
This construction is described intuitively in Figure 2. The
authentic user’s (AU’s) biometric data-points register (mostly)
inside the bottom-right red sphere – which is the user’s
decision region. The radius of this sphere is user-specific, and
has to be chosen to provide a good compromise between false
positives and false negatives. The large sphere represents the
support of the expander’s output – basically, the region of the
vector space in which one would expect to find data points
corresponding to the embeddings of any user’s biometric data.
Registration phase: A codebook is defined over the
vector space, and restricted to the support of the expander’s
output. Different methods can be used to define such a code,
but an optimal choice would be a capacity-achieving code (for
an additive White Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel, if the
vector space is of the form Rn, and for a binary symmetric
channel if the vector space is defined over GF (2n)). For
our specific example, in which embeddings are defined over
R128, we choose a low-density lattice code (LDLC) [37] in
128 dimensions. Next, we identify the center of the AU’s
decision region, and “decode” it to the closest codeword in
the codebook. We then calculate the difference vector (DV)
between the center of the AU’s decision region and the closest
codeword (the middle part of Figure 2). The DV is stored as
part of the AU’s authentication record, along with the hash of
the center of the AU’s decision region.
Verification phase: Upon verifying a user’s claim to be
the AU, the biometric reading is placed (by virtue of the
expander-enhanced classifier) into the vector space, and the
DV is subtracted from it. If this is indeed the AU, the result
of the subtraction should land us in the decoding region of
the codeword identified in the registration phase. The exact
codeword is then identified by decoding. Finally, the DV is
added to this codeword (in an attempt to recover the center
of the AU’s decision region), and the hash of the result is
Fig. 2. Secure sketch construction. Left: The large circle is chosen to contain
all available embeddings, from all users; the small circle for the authentic user
(AU) is chosen to yield a favorable false positive-false negative compromise
(different radii may be chosen for different AUs). Middle: A codebook is
constructed, with Voronoi region congruent to AU’s decision region; the
center of AU’s decision region is decoded to the closest codeword, and the
difference between the center of AU’s decision region and this codeword is
saved to the AU’s record along with the hash of the center of AU’s decision
region. Right: The AU submits a new sample for authentication; by subtracting
the difference vector and decoding to the nearest codeword, the previously-
identified codeword is recovered. We then add the difference to the recovered
codeword, and obtain the center of AU’s decision region; its hash is compared
to AU’s record.
compared to AU’s record. This is described in the right-most
part of Figure 2.
Note. In general, instead of decoding the center of the AU’s
decision region to the closest codeword, we could simply
choose a random codeword, and calculate the DV between
the center of the AU’s decision region and this codeword. But
in this case, additional steps have to be taken to ensure that
the DV does not leak any information about the center of the
AU’s decision region. For example, if we choose a codeword
in the upper-left of the large sphere in Figure 2, the DV has a
large amplitude, and an attacker could infer that the center of
the AU’s decision region is in the lower right. To avoid such
leakage, we would need to add to DV an additional random
vector, the effect of which is neutral when wrapped around the
large sphere (zero modulo the large sphere).
Note. The system can be further simplified by hashing directly
the (closest, or randomly-chosen) codeword. However, with
this implementation, care must be taken to ensure that different
users are assigned different codewords. Using the extra steps
required to store the hash of the center of the AU’s decision
region as above will naturally ensure that different users have
different hashes in the authentication table.
The security of the proposed architecture is tightly con-
nected to the design of the secure sketch. Specifically, the
entropy of the secret authentication material is tightly related
to the logarithm of the number of codewords that fit within
the support of the expander output – i.e., the large circle of
Figure 2. Multiple strategies can be considered when deciding
upon the shape and size of the support of the expander output –
each of these strategies will provide a different way to quantify
the system’s security, although a liberal approach to defining
this region will make sure that the actual system security is
not artificially degraded.
In the left portion of Figure 2 we show multiple clusters
within a vector space, such that each cluster (represented by
markers with a specific shape and color) corresponds to the
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embeddings of the available biometric records for a single
user. In this figure, we decide to consider the support of the
expander output as a sphere that includes all the available
biometric data points. Taking the smallest such sphere may
artificially reduce the security of the protocol – because it
will result in a smaller codebook – so, to be safe, we propose
to take a sphere of radius 10% larger than that of the smallest
outer sphere. For our specific scenario, this yields an outer
sphere radius of 1.0153. With a user-specific decoding region
radius of 0.7, we can fit at most (1.0153/0.7)128 ' 4.7e+20
small spheres within the large 128-dimensional sphere, for an
upper bound on the entropy of the secret biometric information
of around 128 log2 (1.0153/0.7) ' 68 bits.
But this is just an upper bound, and a function of the
design. Choosing a larger outer sphere – say of radius 50%
larger than that of the smallest outer sphere – will significantly
increase the upper bound – albeit, probably without causing
any significant increase in the protocol’s actual security level.
To gauge the actual security level of the protocol, one
could collect biometric information from many subjects, and
select the support of the expander output as some surface
(which need not be connected) that fits tightly around all the
corresponding data points. One way to go about achieving
this would be training a one-class classifier to a class that
consists of all the available data points, from all users. The
security of the protocol would then be quantified as the
logarithm of the number of codewords that fall inside this
surface. One could try to change the codebook design to
fit a few more codewords in this newly discovered surface,
but the added complexity may out-weight the security gain.
An approximate lower bound on the entropy of the secure
biometric information can be established by calculating the
entropy of the probability distribution defined over the entire
support of the expander output, and which fits a histogram of
the available data points, such that each codeword’s decoding
region corresponds to a distinct bin of the histogram.
D. The Hash
The hash component of the NFE architecture is imple-
mented as a simple cryptographic hash function, to be chosen
according to the most recent NIST recommendations. At the
time of this writing, hash functions from the SHA-2 and
SHA-3 families would be perfectly adequate. The user authen-
tication database stores, along with user names, the following
user identifying components: (1) codebook parameters (or just
a decoding algorithm), (2) difference vector (DV), as explained
in Section III-C above; (3) any non-secret randomness such
as salt and pepper used during the hashing process, and (4)
the hash value (with salt, pepper, etc.) of the center of AU’s
decision region, as explained in Section III-C above.
E. Biometric Security Evaluation
We should note here that the proposed methodology for the
expansion of biometric data and for choosing the parameters
of the secure sketch provide – as a byproduct – a way of
evaluating the security potential of various biometric data.
Fig. 3. VGG16 Network
It would be possible in this framework to decide (at least
approximately, based on the upper and lower bounds on
the entropy of a user’s biometric data) whether fingerprint-
based biometrics, for instance, are more or less secure than,
say retina-scan-based biometrics. This evaluation is related to
the average (across multiple possible AUs) accuracy of the
associated classifier, but is not straightforward to derive from
it, and would not be feasible in the absence of the expander.
IV. DEMONSTRATION OF NFE RETROFIT
A. Classifier and Expander Architecture
For the classifier, we used a modified VGG16 model ar-
chitecture [38], [39] (Figure 3) with weights pre-trained on
ImageNet using Keras. To retrofit the DFE to this classifier,
we constructed an expander, by removing the final softmax
layer and adding three more fully connected layers of 512, 256
and 128 neurons respectively. It should be noted that for this
specific application, our “expander” is in fact not expanding at
all, but rather contracting the ANN’s output. This is to reduce
the complexity of the decoding involved in the secure sketch.
Nevertheless, the same exact principles apply in situations in
which the expander actually expands the output size.
B. One Shot classification and Siamese network
In the case of standard identification methods, a set of
images are fed into the ANN to get an output probability of
different classes. For example, if we want to identify between
cat and dog we want to collect a lot of images (possibly more
than 500 images per class) to improve model accuracy. The
drawback of this type of network in fingerprint identification is
first, it is nearly impossible to get a lot of images and second,
if we want to include a new user in our database, we need to
retrain the model to identify the new user as well. It is for
these reasons that Siamese networks prove useful.
A siamese network (sometimes called a twin neural net-
work) is an ANN which learns to differentiate between two
inputs instead of classifying. It takes two input images, runs
through the same network simultaneously, and generates two
vector embeddings of the images which are run through a
logistic loss to calculate a similarity score between the two
images [40]. This is very useful as it does not require many
data points to train the model. Secondly, we only need to store
one image of the user as a reference image and calculate the
similarity for every new instance presented to the network.
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Fig. 4. Triplet Loss architecture with Siamese network: Three images
(”Anchor”,”Positive” and ”Negative”) are passed through the same CNN
simultaneously to generate a final layer of 128 dimensional vector. Then all
three vectors are passed through the triplet loss function to minimize the
distance between ”Anchor” and ”Positive” as well as maximizing the distance
between ”Anchor” and ”Negative”.
We used a triplet loss function with Siamese networks for
our work. The benefit of using a triplet loss function (explained
in the next subsection) in conjunction with a Siamese network
is twofold [41]:
1) It extracts more features by learning to maximize the
similarity between two similar images (Anchor-Positive)
and the distance between two different images (Anchor-
Negative) at the same time.
2) It generates more training samples than logistic loss. If
we have P similar pairs and N dissimilar pairs then for
logistic loss we will have P +N total training samples.
Whereas, we will have PN triplets for training. This
will impove the model accuracy.
Our Siamese network architecture is depicted Figure 4.
C. Triplet Loss Function
Triplet loss functions are widely used in various applications
in computer vision, such as face recognition [42], person re-
identification [43] and image retrieval [44]. Taking inspiration
from that we used this for fingerprint verification. We will
further explain how triplet loss functions work.
If we use a CNN to convert an image x into a d-dimensional
Euclidean space, then the embedding is represented by f(x) ∈
Rd. Here f is the function computed by the CNN.
For training we used triplets of fingerprint images (Fig. 5):
• A is an ”anchor” image – a fingerprint image of a user.
• P is a ”positive” image – a fingerprint image of the same
user.
• N is a ”negative” image – a fingerprint image of a
different user.
We write triplets as (A(i), P (i), N (i)) where i denotes the
ith training example. We want to make sure that P is closer
Fig. 5. Triplet Loss architecture: The architecture tries to minimize the
distance between ”Anchor” and ”Positive” and maximize distance between
”Anchor” and ”Negative”
to A than N. Thus, we want
‖f(A(i))− f(P (i))‖22 + α < ‖f(A(i))− f(N (i))‖22
for all {f(A(i)), f(P (i)), f(N (i))} ∈ T , where T is the set
of all possible triplets. Here, we want to make sure that the
positive pair (A(i) − P (i)) has at least a margin difference of
α over the negative pair (A(i) − N (i)). So the ”triplet cost”
function for the CNN becomes
n∑
i=1
[
‖f(A(i))− f(P (i))‖22 − ‖f(A(i))− f(N (i))‖22 + α
]
+
.
Generating all possible triplets for training will result in
slower convergence, so it is important to select a combination
of ”hard” and ”easy” batches for the improvement of the
model.
D. Evaluation
Dataset: We used the FVC2006 Dataset for our research.
The database consists of 4 distinct subsets DB1, DB2, DB3
and DB4. Each database consists of 150 fingers and 12
impressions per finger. Each subset is further divided into ”set
A” and ”set B” where ”set A” contains 140x12 images and
”set B” contains 10x12 images At the time of this writing we
only used DB1, which has an image size of 96x96 but we
expect similar results with the other databases.
Training Data: For training we took 10 impressions per
finger from DB1-A (total of 140x10 images) and generated
the triplet pairs. In this paper, we used 50% ”hard” and 50%
”easy” triplet pairs.
Testing Data: For testing we used 2 impressions per
finger from DB1-A (total of 140x2 images).
Results: We obtained 95.36% accuracy on the training
data (13 mismatches out of 280 fingerprint impressions) , with
a decoding region radius of 0.7 for all users (see Section III-C).
We obtained an outer sphere radius of 1.0153, yielding an
upper bound on the entropy of the secret biometric information
of around 128 log2 (1.0153/0.7) ' 68 bits.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a secure architecture for bio-
metric user authentication (or identification), which avoids
the storage of information (such as neural network weights
or specific biometric data) that could be used by malicious
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entities for constructing artificial biometric inputs able to
pass the authentication tests. To that extent, the proposed
architecture aligns with the current paradigm for handling
users’ passwords. The proposed architecture – which we call a
neural fuzzy extractor – works by coupling the classifier with
a fuzzy extractor – this is possible by the use of an expander,
which is a neural network that can be trained at the same
time as, or after, the classifier. The NFE architecture can be
retrofitted to any already-existing well-performing classifier,
and should combine the classification performance of artificial
neural networks with the security of fuzzy extractors. Our
instantiation of the NFE for fingerprint-based authentication
demonstrates how a classic classifier can be retrofitted for NFE
implementation, and how training can be conducted for NFE-
specific output-space sphere clustering. Future work should
focus on (1) comparison of NFE-retrofitted architectures to
their original counterparts, and techniques for avoiding ac-
curacy degradation and (2) the construction and training of
expanders suited to coding over binary extension fields.
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